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A Rosetta Stone for Causation
Martin Katz
abstract. The law of mental causation—or motives—is a mess. It is as if writers in the ﬁeld

are using diﬀerent languages to describe a multiplicity of causal concepts. The plethora of causal
terms and lack of deﬁnitional clarity make it diﬃcult to understand the relationship among causal concepts within a single area of law, let alone across substantive areas of law. To reach a clear
and consistent understanding of this mess, it would be useful to have a Rosetta Stone—a translation key describing causal concepts and the relationships among those concepts in a precise and
universal way. Andrew Verstein’s article, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, comes close to reaching this ideal. However, his model suﬀers from two critical ﬂaws: failing to justify a key analytical move and using terminology that is more confusing than it is universal. In this Response, I
suggest remedies to those problems as well as a way to transform Verstein’s model into a Rosetta
Stone for mental causation.

introduction
To say that the law of mental causation is a complicated mess would be a
gross understatement. The law of mental causation, also known as motive,1 has
long been in need of a Rosetta Stone—a clear, precise, and universally applicable taxonomy of causal standards.

1.
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This piece is a Response to Andrew Verstein’s article, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, 127
YALE L.J. 1106 (2018). Verstein focuses on motives, as opposed to causation, to avoid taking
a position on the question of whether motives should be considered causal in human decision making. See id. at 1124. As will be discussed below, whatever one might believe about
the role of motives in decision making as a matter of psychology or philosophy, the law
treats motives as causal. See infra note 27 and accompanying text. Accordingly, I treat the
question of motives in the law as a question of causation.
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Many ﬁelds of law require inquiry into whether a particular mental state
has caused a contested decision.2 For example, in employment law, courts must
o�en examine whether an employer’s consideration of an employee’s race
caused the employer’s decision to ﬁre the employee.3
The complication begins with the fact that causation, whether in the physical or mental world, is not singular. There are several diﬀerent types of causal
relationships that any given law may require.4 In our ﬁring example, for instance, the law might require proof that the employer would not have made the
decision to ﬁre the employee absent consideration of race (a type of causation
called necessity, or but-for causation). Alternatively, the law might require only
that race played some role in the decision to ﬁre, irrespective of whether race
was necessary to that decision (a type of causation that is sometimes called Motivating Factor causation).5 Or the law might require some other type of causal
relationship or combination of causal relationships.6
The problem is that, in many areas of the law, it is not clear what type of
causal relationship is required. Some laws invoke causation without even attempting to specify what type of causation they require.7 Others refer to causal
standards that are undeﬁned or ill-deﬁned.8 And, to complicate matters further,
legislators, courts, and commentators o�en use a wide variety of terms to refer
to causal standards, making it diﬃcult to identify the causal standards they are
discussing, let alone to understand the relationship between the standards they
reference. For example, in one famous case, the Supreme Court used over
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

8.
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See Verstein, supra note 1, at 1108, app. B at 1170.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting adverse employment actions that occur because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Verstein’s article provides an excellent
catalog of the areas of law that require mental causation. See Verstein, supra note 1, at 110814.
See Verstein, supra note 1, at 1115-17; Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII:
Making Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L. J. 489 (2006).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, e-5 (2012).
In the ﬁring example, the law requires “Motivating Factor” causation for liability, but Necessity for full damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, e-5 (2012).
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (requiring that the adverse employment action, such
as ﬁring, must be “because of” the speciﬁed motivation, such as consideration of race, but
not specifying any particular type of causal relationship). This particular statute was amended in 1991 to attempt to clarify this question. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). Numerous other anti-discrimination laws use similar language.
See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-633(b)
(2012); Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C §§ 12101-12117 (2012).
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075 (1991) (referring
to “Motivating Factor” causation in order to “clarify[]” the “prohibition against impermissible consideration” or protected bases, but failing to provide any deﬁnition for that standard).

a rosetta stone for causation

twenty diﬀerent labels to describe the causation requirement in a landmark civil rights law.9
As an optimist, I have long believed that it should be possible to
(1) identify the universe of potentially applicable causal standards; (2) clearly
deﬁne each of those standards (and their relationship to one another); and (3)
attach a universally applicable and accepted label to each causal standard. In
other words, I believed that we might be able to create a Rosetta Stone to clear
up the confusion that reigns in the Babel of mental causation. With such a tool,
we could easily describe and identify the causal standards used in a particular
ﬁeld of law. We could engage in cross-substantive discussions of causation, so
that judges and scholars in one ﬁeld might learn from those in other ﬁelds. And
we could engage in meaningful debates about the normative merits of any particular causal requirement. To mix my metaphors, such a Rosetta Stone would
be a holy grail for the ﬁeld of mental causation.
Several years ago, I started such a project.10 In the ﬁeld of employment discrimination law, I identiﬁed a universe of six potentially applicable causal
standards, precisely deﬁned those standards and their relation to each other,
and labeled them using (for the most part) terms that had been used to describe causal relationships for millennia. I even included a ni�y graphic designed to show the standards and their relationship to each other, reproduced
below as Figure 1.11
FIGURE 1
POTENTIAL CAUSAL STANDARDS FROM KATZ (2006)

Potential Causal Standards
Most Restrictive

Least Restrictive

Both Necessity and Suﬃciency
Necessity Only
Suﬃciency Only
(But For)
Either Necessity or Suﬃciency
Minimal Causation (some causal force, but
neither necessary nor suﬃcient)
No Causation

9.

See Katz, supra note 4, at 491-92, 491 n.5 (analyzing causal standards articulated by the various Justices in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)).
10. Katz, supra note 4.
11. Id. at 499.
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I used this tool to make sense of current employment discrimination law standards and to address their normative implications.
I hoped that this tool might make it possible to explore causal standards in
other ﬁelds of law, such as constitutional law. But as a law school dean, I never
found time to take that next step in cross-substantive study. So I was thrilled to
read Verstein’s exciting article, The Jurisprudence of Mixed Motives, which undertook just such a project using his own ni�y graphic.
I know that scholars are supposed to be defensive of their own work, but
when I read Verstein’s piece, my ﬁrst reaction was that he had considered much
that I had not—bringing us much closer to the Rosetta Stone that I had been
seeking. He also made tremendous progress on the cross-substantive project.
My next reaction was that his article contains some ﬂaws that prevent his
framework from achieving Rosetta Stone status. My ﬁnal reaction was that
those ﬂaws can be remedied. And if we do so, we will indeed have found our
Rosetta Stone. That is my project in this Response.
Part I explains the exciting potential of Verstein’s article. Parts II and III explore two problems with the piece that signiﬁcantly undercut its potential utility. Part II describes the article’s lack of a compelling justiﬁcation for one of the
most important and exciting parts of its analysis. Part III notes the use of confusing terminology, which is particularly problematic in a project designed to
promote clarity. For each of those problems, I suggest solutions. My hope is
that those solutions will complement and complete Verstein’s project, making it
more useful and accessible as a clear, precise, and universally applicable taxonomy of causal standards—a Rosetta Stone for mental causation.
i. big steps forward
The goal of scholarly debate is to advance the state of knowledge and understanding in its ﬁeld. Verstein’s article does exactly that. In my case, his article made me also realize that my own framework of causal standards lacked
some important parts that signiﬁcantly impaired its utility.
First, my framework lacked a quantitative, or scalar, component.12 The
standards in my framework—which are based on the logical causal relationships of “Necessity” and “Suﬃciency”—are purely qualitative, or binary. Take
Suﬃciency, for example. We can say that a mental state (consideration of race)
12.

880

I use the term “quantitative” to mean the ability to evaluate the presence of “more” or “less”
of something. I do not claim (and Verstein does not appear to claim) to have discovered or
conceptualized a unit of measure for motive or mental causation (other than “Suﬃciency,”
which is the quantum of causal force that will trigger the decision or event in question). Accordingly, I do not use the term “quantitative” to mean being susceptible to precise, numerical measurement.
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was suﬃcient to trigger a particular decision (ﬁring). But Suﬃciency is binary.
Something is either suﬃcient or insuﬃcient. It makes no sense to say that a
factor is more suﬃcient or less suﬃcient. The same is true of Necessity. A mental state (consideration of race) may be necessary to the occurrence of a decision (ﬁring), such that the event would not have occurred absent the existence
of that mental state. But this, too, is binary. It makes no sense to say that a factor was more necessary or less necessary.
However, a quantitative conception of mental causation—admitting of degrees—would permit an expansion of the universe of potential causal standards. Instead of being limited to saying that a factor was necessary or suﬃcient,
we might be able to say that a factor was a “big inﬂuence” or a “small inﬂuence,” or that one factor was “more inﬂuential” than another. This, in turn,
might permit the articulation and use of quantitative standards for causation
that might supplement or even replace qualitative standards. For example, we
might meaningfully require that a motive exert a certain level of causal inﬂuence (e.g., “more than de minimis”), or that the motive exert more of a causal
inﬂuence than other motives.13
Additionally, a quantitative conception of causal inﬂuence might clarify the
relationship between causal standards in a way that is not possible using purely
qualitative concepts. In my model, using only quantitative conceptions, I was
able to depict the relationship between causal standards on a single axis: some
standards are more restrictive (and thus, more defendant-friendly) than others.14 Yet, this understanding is limited. First, it cannot help us compare Necessity to Suﬃciency. Looking at restrictiveness can help us see that a compound
standard requiring both of those standards (Necessity-and-Suﬃciency) is more
restrictive than a non-compound standard requiring only one of them. But it
does not permit us to say whether a Necessity standard is more or less restrictive than a Suﬃciency standard.15 The other problem with this single axis approach is that there may be other ways besides restrictiveness to conceptualize
the relationship between Necessity and Suﬃciency.
Verstein posits and develops exactly such a quantitative approach.16 His
model permits us to examine the causal inﬂuence of a particular motive, both
absolutely (a motive might be considered weak or strong), and comparatively
(one motive might be considered stronger than another). He then uses this
13.

I am not arguing here that such quantitative standards are normatively desirable in any particular area of the law. My point is that it might be useful to consider that question, and that
a quantitative conception of mental causation, such as that oﬀered by Verstein, allows us to
do so.
14. See supra Figure 1.
15. See id.
16. See Verstein, supra note 1, at 1126 ﬁg.1 (plotting motivational force on graph).
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quantitative conception of motives to depict the interaction of motives graphically, with axes that represent the relative causal force of each motive, as well as
the level of causal force that is independently suﬃcient to trigger the event in
question.17

17.

882

Verstein also introduces the very helpful concept of “independent suﬃciency.” In my framework, I identiﬁed two types of suﬃciency: strong and weak. Katz, supra note 4, at 497 n.25.
Factors that were strongly suﬃcient would trigger the event in question irrespective of any
other factors that might be present. It is actually hard to imagine such a factor. As explained
by Mark Kelman, “[G]iven that the injury cannot have occurred unless the plaintiﬀ (P), at a
minimum, existed, that is P is invariably a necessary condition for the damage to occur, we
can never causally attribute any injury solely to a second party, a defendant (D).” Mark Kelman, The Necessary Myth of Objective Causation Judgments in Liberal Political Theory, 63 CHI.KENT L. REV. 579, 579 (1987). Hence, in my analysis, I relied on the concept of weak suﬃciency: a factor that, when combined with all other factors then-present, will trigger the
event in question. Verstein’s concept of independent suﬃciency is similar. But instead of looking at all other factors that are present at the time of the event in question, he looks only at
the other factor that is under consideration, and then posits the absence of the other factor.
Thus, looking at two forces, A and B, he would say that B is independently suﬃcient if,
when added to all other factors then present other than A, B would trigger the event. Put
diﬀerently, in a two-factor world (only A and B), B is independently suﬃcient if it would
trigger the event in the complete absence of A. This is a highly useful concept, and when I
refer to suﬃciency here, that is the concept to which I refer.

a rosetta stone for causation
FIGURE 2

VERSTEIN’S GRAPHIC MODEL18

Verstein’s graph depicts a simpliﬁed world with two motives, one (BMotive) which is proscribed by the law (such as the race in ﬁring employees),
and the other (A-Motive) which is permitted (such as tardiness in ﬁring employees). His graph permits us to visualize motives as having causal force and
interacting with each other. As we move outward along each axis, we can see
the causal force of each motive increase. If the causal force of either motive, or
of the combined motives, crosses the threshold value of 1 (Verstein’s designator
for Suﬃciency), that combined force will trigger the decision in question. This
occurs anywhere above and to the right of the diagonal dashed line connecting
the 1s on both axes. But if the force of A-Motive alone crosses that threshold, it
means that A-Motive alone is suﬃcient, which in turn precludes B-Motive
from being necessary (or a “but for” cause). This occurs anywhere above the
dashed line extending horizontally from the 1 on the A-axis. The graph also al-

18.

Verstein, supra note 1, at 1128 ﬁg.2 (labels removed).
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lows us to see quantitative concepts, such as whether there is “a lot” of BMotive or only “a little,” and whether there is more B-Motive than A-Motive.
This incredibly useful visual aid permits a precise understanding, and thus,
precise description, of the universe of potential causal concepts, both qualitative and quantitative. In other words, it appears to be an excellent foundation
for the type of Rosetta Stone that I hoped someone might be able to create.
And armed with this tool, Verstein starts the extremely valuable project of cataloging the causal standards used across a wide range of substantive areas of
law.
However, despite this signiﬁcant accomplishment, there are two ﬂaws in
the article which, if not addressed, may prevent Verstein’s excellent framework
from becoming the Rosetta Stone of mental causation. First, Verstein fails to
provide an adequate justiﬁcation for the quantiﬁcation of mental causation that
lies at the core of his model. Second, instead of using standard causal terminology in his model and his taxonomy, Verstein creates a new taxonomy, which
may cause more confusion and decrease the utility of the model he has developed. The good news is that these ﬂaws can be ﬁxed. I propose solutions in the
following Parts.
ii. justifying the quantification of motives
As noted above, the key analytical move underlying Verstein’s project is the
idea that motives can be quantiﬁed. Without quantiﬁcation, we are le� with
only the traditional qualitative measures of causation. And without the quantiﬁcation of motives, it would not be possible to construct the graphs on which
Verstein relies to develop his taxonomy.19
Yet, despite the importance of quantiﬁcation to his project, Verstein does
little to justify his quantiﬁcation of motives. His primary justiﬁcation is based
on an intuition about a qualitative—not quantitative—conception of motive.
He notes:
We observe that some people subject to A-Motives act on them, and
some ﬁnd them insuﬃciently motivating and do not act. Likewise, the
same individual may act on A-Motives one day and not another. It
would seem that some motivations are suﬃcient to prompt action, and

19.
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As noted above, supra note 12, I use the term “quantitative” to mean the ability to evaluate
the presence of “more” or “less” of something. I do not use the term “quantitative” to mean
being susceptible to precise, numerical measurement.
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some are so weak as to be ignored, particularly when there are costs to
action.20
His point is that we can intuitively observe that some motives are suﬃcient to
trigger action, while others are not. Yet, as noted above, suﬃciency is a qualitative concept, not a quantitative one. The intuition that a motive may be suﬃcient or insuﬃcient does not support the idea that we can or should think of
motives as quantiﬁable.
Note that we can probably make similar intuitive observations that would
more directly support the idea that motives might be quantitative: we might
sense that a particular motivation feels strong or weak. Similarly, when making
decisions based upon multiple considerations or motives, we might sense that
some of our motivations seem stronger, while others seem weaker. And we can
have these quantitative intuitions irrespective of their qualitative result—that is,
irrespective of whether a motivation (or combination of motivations) is suﬃcient to trigger a particular decision.
However, even this intuitive observation, while more tailored to the argument that motives can be quantiﬁed, does not fully support the quantitative
model. This is because the question we must answer is not a psychological one
about how motive actually works inside the human mind. While that is an interesting question, and while the intuitive observation above may give us some
comfort that the answer to that psychological question is consistent with a
quantitative model, the key question is actually a legal one: Does the law conceptualize motivation as quantitative, or at least permit such a conceptualization?21 I will argue that it does.
The starting point for this analysis is to embrace the notion that the law
sees motives as causal. In fact, many (if not most) of the laws that require inquiries into motives actually speak in terms of causation. For example, Title
VII, the landmark civil rights law, does not speak of motive; rather, it prohibits
adverse employment actions (such as ﬁring) where those actions occur “because of” certain protected characteristics (such as race or sex).22 That is, the
law uses the language of causation to describe a mental state. That relevant
20.

Verstein, supra note 1, at 1125 (emphases added).
Perhaps it is for this reason that Verstein eschews the question of whether his model is psychologically accurate. See id. (noting that his model is “not meant to literally describe human
psychology”). Avoidance of this issue is probably wise because, irrespective of the accuracy
of a view that ascribes quantiﬁable strengths to human motivations, as law professors, we
likely have little to add to that particular debate. Like Verstein, I do not make any claims
about the psychology of motive. Nor do I make any claims about whether, as a prescriptive
matter, the law of motive should be consistent with the best psychological research on motive. Rather, my project here is a descriptive one focused on the law of motive.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
21.
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mental state is generally described as “motive.”23 So the inquiry, under these
laws, is whether the motive in question caused the decision in question. In other words, the law treats motive as a form of mental causation.24
We can measure causation in three diﬀerent ways. First, we can use a
measure of existence: either a casual factor was present, or it was not. This
measure is workable where the law looks only at a single causal factor (which
was either present or not). But this measure does not work where the law considers the interplay between multiple causal factors (mixed motives), as it o�en
does.25 In such cases, we can measure causation in a second way: qualitatively.
For example, we might ask whether a particular factor was suﬃcient to trigger
a particular outcome, or whether the factor was necessary to the outcome. Note
that these measures do not expressly attempt to ascribe values to causal forces.
A force may be suﬃcient to trigger an event irrespective of whether it is a large
force (a heavy brick on a camel’s back) or a small force (a straw on a camel’s
back). Similarly, a force may be necessary for an event to occur irrespective of
whether it is a large or small force, since whether a factor is necessary to cause
an event depends on the existence and causal force of other factors. Hence, we
can refer to these measures as qualitative. Yet there is also a third way we might
measure causation: quantitatively. That is, we may think of factors as carrying

23.

See Katz, supra note 4, at 500 (showing that “motivating factor” is among the most commonly used formulations for describing the causation requirement); Verstein, supra note 1,
at 1108 (describing law’s concern with motive as “universal”).
24. See Sheila R. Foster, Causation in Antidiscrimination Law: Beyond Intent Versus Impact, 41
HOUS. L. REV. 1469, 1471 n.4 (“Notably, others have pointed out that the intent requirement
in both constitutional and statutory law is better understood as a causation requirement.”).
Verstein expressly avoids discussing causation. Verstein, supra note 1, at 1124 (“This Article
avoids causal language whenever possible.”). He does so because he understands that some
commentators have problematized the application of causal concepts to mental states. Id. at
1124 n.77 (noting H.L.A. Hart and Tony Honoré’s rejection of determinism in causation).
However, irrespective of the psychology or philosophy of motives as causation, the law has
unequivocally embraced the idea that motives can be understood and evaluated as being
causal in human decision making. See D. Don Welch, Removing Discriminatory Barriers: Basing Disparate Treatment Analysis on Motive Rather than Intent, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 739
(1987) (“Motive is a causal concept. It comes into play when a concern exists that decisions
were made ‘because of’ or ‘on the grounds of’ certain factors.”). Moreover, Verstein’s whole
framework is organized around a distinctly causal concept: suﬃciency. The most important
value on his graph—the one that distinguishes almost all of the causal concepts in his taxonomy—is the value of one, which he deﬁnes as representing the level at which a motive becomes independently suﬃcient to trigger the decision in question. See Verstein, supra note 1,
at 1125-27.
25. The multiple factors can be physical factors, such as the famous two-ﬁres case in tort law.
See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 145-47 (5th ed. 1999). Or the multiple factors may be mental factors, as in the many areas ably catalogued by Verstein. See
Verstein, supra note 1, app. B at 1170.
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certain causal weights, such that those with more causal weight are more likely
to trigger an event.
In the physical world, we can easily see how the law (as well as the laws of
physics) embrace quantitative conceptions of causation. Take, for example, the
ubiquitous discussions in tort law about the proverbial straw that broke the
camel’s back.26 These discussions envision that physical forces have measurable
weights (such as the weights of cars on a bridge or straws on a camel), which
exert causal force toward an event (such as the collapse of the bridge or the
camel). The weights, or other physical measures, are understood as quantities,
which can be compared to each other and to the quantities required to trigger
an outcome.
The law seems to extend this physical view of causation into the world of
mental causation. In many places, the law expressly makes this analogy. For example, in antidiscrimination cases in employment law and constitutional law,
which involve mental causation (motive), the courts have routinely looked to
concepts of physical causation from tort law to inform their analysis.27
But even where the law does not make the analogy expressly, I would argue
that it o�en does so implicitly, and that Verstein’s quantitative move is therefore justiﬁed. This is because the law of mental causation wholeheartedly
adopts qualitative concepts of causation (necessity and suﬃciency).28 And
those qualitative concepts, in turn, are built upon quantitative conceptions of
causation. Consider the causal concept of suﬃciency. The concept asks whether
a factor will trigger an event. Thus, the concept seems to posit that (1) the factor carries some quantum of causal force and (2) the event has a trigger point
that depends on the total quantum of causal force from that factor along with
other factors. (The axes in Verstein’s graphs illustrate this quite well.) In turn,
the concept of necessity depends on the concept of suﬃciency. The thing that
prevents one factor from being necessary is the existence of another factor that
is suﬃcient. Thus, both of the core qualitative concepts in causation—necessity

26.

See, e.g., Katz, supra note 4, at 498.
27. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989) (plurality opinion) (employing the “simple example” of “two physical forces” that are each quantitatively suﬃcient
to cause a certain outcome to illustrate that the presence of two suﬃcient causes does not
mean that neither “caused” the result); Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977). Additionally, courts routinely use quantitative-like language to describe causal concepts. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (discussing a
situation where an employer gives “substantial weight to an impermissible criterion”).
28. See Katz, supra note 4, at 510-11. Note that a determination that a certain factor is necessary
requires a determination that another is not suﬃcient. A factor (B) is a necessary cause of an
event only if another factor (A) is not independently suﬃcient to cause the event.
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and suﬃciency—which are expressly invoked in mental causation cases, contemplate a quantitative view of motives as causal forces.29
For these reasons, applying a quantitative conception of motives, as Verstein does, seems justiﬁed. The Rosetta Stone’s foundation seems solid.
iii. a universal taxonomy
To be truly useful as a Rosetta Stone, a framework of potential causal
standards must not only be comprehensive, precise, and based on a solid conceptual foundation; it must also employ a universally accepted (or acceptable)
taxonomy. The very need for a Rosetta Stone comes from the fact that diﬀerent
people use diﬀerent terms to refer to the same concept. If I refer to a concept as
blue-causation, Verstein refers to the concept as green-causation, and a judge
trying to apply the concept refers to it as yellow-causation, we run the very serious risk of failing to communicate—or, at the very least, failing to communicate eﬀectively. In fact, it is exactly this type of confusion that seems to have
motivated Verstein to develop his framework.30
This Part argues that Verstein uses terminology that risks moving us further from a uniform lexicon for causal concepts. This is not simply a debate
about preferences for particular terms over others. The primary point of both
Verstein’s article and my 2006 article is to catalog and label the universe of potential causal concepts in a clear and authoritative way, in order to facilitate
meaningful identiﬁcation and discussion of those concepts.31 If the labels we
introduce depart from those that are commonly used and understood, this goal
is less likely to be realized. To avoid this problem, I will oﬀer a translation of
the causal concepts that Verstein identiﬁes into traditional causal language. I
will then provide a comprehensive “key” to show how those causal concepts
can be used alone or in combination to form legal tests or standards.

29.

This argument says nothing about measurement or proof of quantitative motive. We do not
have units by which to measure the causal force of motives, much less a good way to examine the inner workings of a person’s mind (or a group’s “mind”). For these reasons, asking
parties to prove, and factﬁnders to evaluate, the mere existence of a particular motive can be
problematic. Asking them to quantify that motive seems like an even more diﬃcult task.
However, as noted above, these tasks are inherent in the law’s command that we engage in
the qualitative and quantitative evaluation of motives.
30. Verstein, supra note 1, at 1108-11 (decrying doctrinal disorder in discussion of mixed motives). The prevalence of this type of confusion also motived me to write my original article.
See Katz, supra note 4, at 492-94.
31. See Katz, supra note 4, at 493, 495-500.
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A. Adding Confusion to an Already-Confused Field
Rather than rely or build on existing terms for causal concepts, Verstein
adds yet more terms to a world that already suﬀers from too many. For example, consider his basic graph32:
FIGURE 3
VERSTEIN’S NEW TERMINOLOGY

In this one graph, Verstein introduces ﬁve new causal terms: Sole Determination (A), Sole Determination (B), Overdetermination, Hybrid Case, and No
Action.33

32.

Verstein, supra note 1, at 1131 ﬁg.3.
33. As noted below, some of Verstein’s terms (such as “overdetermination” and “sole determination”) appear in other work on causation, and are not “new” in that sense. Those terms are
new in the sense that Verstein uses them in novel ways, at odds with prior usage.
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Adding to the confusion, he also seems to use these terms in ways that are
at odds with some existing usages. For example, he uses the term “overdetermination” to describe cases in which there are two independently suﬃcient
causes (the upper right-hand quadrant). But other authors have used the term
“over-determined” to refer to cases in which the factor in question (B-Motive)
is not necessary (or a but-for cause), which happens any time that A-Motive is
independently suﬃcient (represented by both of the upper quadrants).34 Similarly, Verstein uses the term “Sole Determination” to describe the upper le�hand quadrant (in which B is neither necessary nor suﬃcient) and the lower
right-hand quadrant (in which B is both necessary and suﬃcient). However,
most writers who use the term “sole” to describe causation are referring to cases where B-Motive is present and no other relevant factors, such as A-Motive,
are present (that is, A=0). These labels introduced by Verstein are at odds with
existing usages, and thus particularly confusing.35
The situation becomes even more confusing when Verstein moves from deﬁning causal concepts to deﬁning tests that appear to be based on some of
those causal concepts, like his description of what he calls the “Sole Motive”
test36:

34.

See Katz, supra note 4, at 512 n.93.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976) (distinguishing but-for causation from sole causation).
36. Verstein, supra note 1, at 1140 ﬁg.8.
35.

890

a rosetta stone for causation
FIGURE 4
VERSTEIN’S “SOLE MOTIVE” TEST

The shaded area in this test has no apparent connection to the “Sole Determination (A)” concept discussed above, and overlaps only slightly with the “Sole
Determination (B)” concept, though this test bears a much closer resemblance
to the existing usage of the phrase “sole causation.”37
Or consider the test Verstein labels “Any Motive”38:

37.
38.

See McDonald, 427 U.S. at 282 n.10.
Verstein, supra note 1, at 1142 ﬁg.9.
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FIGURE 5
VERSTEIN’S “ANY MOTIVE” TEST

The label “Any Motive” makes it sound as if the test is satisﬁed so long as any
motive (A-Motive or B-Motive) is present. But the point of the test is to describe cases in which B-Motive is present (B>0) and the event in question has
occurred (A+B>=1). The existence of A-Motive is largely irrelevant in this test,
creating yet another confusing label.
With all of these new, and o�en confusing, labels, Verstein’s model risks
not living up to its potential. To serve as a Rosetta Stone, the model must use
terminology that is universally applicable and universally (or at least widely)
accepted. Verstein’s frequent use of new and confusing terminology makes it
unlikely that the model can accomplish this. Fortunately, this problem can be
remedied. That is my project in the next Section.
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B. Translating Verstein into Traditional Causal Concepts
To start with, it will be helpful to distinguish causal concepts (or causal attributes) from causal tests. Causal attributes can be thought of as building
blocks for causal tests. For example, we can think of necessity and suﬃciency as
causal attributes. They can be used either alone or in conjunction with other
causal attributes to form causal tests. For example, the law might require (1)
Necessity, (2) Suﬃciency, (3) Necessity but not Suﬃciency, (4) Suﬃciency but
not Necessity, (5) both Necessity and Suﬃciency, or (6) either Necessity or
Suﬃciency. These six causal tests are built using the two causal attributes—or
building blocks—of necessity and suﬃciency.
Verstein’s illustrates these two traditional causal attributes (necessity and
suﬃciency) graphically. Yet, he applies nontraditional—and confusing—labels
to these attributes. This problem can be remedied by translating his graph into
traditional causal language. We can start using his basic graph (minus the labels)39:

39.

Verstein, supra note 1, at 1131 ﬁg.3 (labels removed).
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FIGURE 6
VERSTEIN’S BASIC GRAPH

This graph essentially depicts the two traditional qualitative causal attributes
related to B-Motive: necessity and suﬃciency.40 We can see this by changing
Verstein’s labels as follows:

40.
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Note that all of the labels I will use for causal attributes will be B-centric. That is, when I
refer to necessity, I mean to say that B-Motive is necessary. Or when I refer to suﬃciency, I
mean to say that B-Motive is suﬃcient. I use this convention because the whole point of the
model is to describe the causal status of B-Motive—the motive that, when considered causal,
is proscribed by the law.
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FIGURE 7
VERSTEIN’S BASIC GRAPH—TRANSLATED

Note that the point is not merely to relabel the graph. Rather, it is to note that
the graph essentially shows combinations of the two traditional, qualitative
causal attributes: necessity and suﬃciency. As noted above, those concepts have
been in use for millennia and are widely used and accepted. No new terms are
required to describe them.41

41.

I understand that Verstein had a reason for eschewing traditional causal taxonomy: he seeks
to avoid taking a position in the debate about whether motives should be considered causal,
and whether doing so leaves suﬃcient room for the concept of free will. See Verstein, supra
note 1, at 1124. For that reason, he prefers his own labels over labels that embrace a causal
view of motives. However, he cannot escape the fact that many (if not most) of the areas of
law he references expressly invoke causal language—such as “because of”—in relation to
motives. Moreover, the majority of Verstein’s framework is built around the causal concept
of suﬃciency. The only value speciﬁed in his graph is the number one, which he uses to designate the point at which a motive becomes suﬃcient to trigger the action in question. So,
like it or not, he seems to be talking about motives as causal. He might as well embrace that
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C. Nontraditional Causal Concepts
By focusing on the relationship between Verstein’s work and these traditional causal concepts of necessity and suﬃciency, we can also see where Verstein has identiﬁed less traditional causal concepts (which are not likely susceptible to traditional causal labels). Two such concepts are apparent in his basic
graph. First, consider the black triangle in the lower le�-hand corner. That triangle can be described as depicting an area in which B-Motive is neither necessary nor suﬃcient. But we can say the same about the upper le�-hand quadrangle. The distinction between these two regions, which is highlighted by the
label Verstein uses for the black triangle, is that, in the black triangle, the decision or action in question will not occur. The two motives, individually or in
combination, are insuﬃcient to trigger the action (A+B<1).
Verstein tends to discount the usefulness of this region. On one hand, this
may be the right approach if we adopt a “no harm, no foul” norm.42 On the
other hand, irrespective of harm, the defendant in this zone has engaged in
proscribed behavior, having applied some quantum of B-Motive in the decision-making process, even if he or she failed to reach an adverse decision. But
my point here is not to debate whether any particular law does or should impose liability in this region. Rather, the point is that if our goal is a complete
catalog of potential causal concepts, we should include this one.
That leaves the question of how to label the concept reﬂected in this part of
Verstein’s graph (the lower, le�-hand, black triangle). Unlike the concepts of
necessity and suﬃciency, no well-established label has routinely been applied
to the concept reﬂected in this zone. Given that the point of the zone is to denote an area in which there is no action, Verstein’s label of “No Action” to describe the zone seems appropriate. This still leaves the question of how to refer
and accept the beneﬁt of using causal labels that are likely to be more universally understood
(and used) than his own new, and somewhat idiosyncratic taxonomy.
Verstein does provide translations between his taxonomy and traditional causal language—though, for some reason, he refers to the latter as the language of tort law (which
happens to use the language of traditional causation). See, e.g., Verstein, supra note 1, at 1128
n.88. I would suggest that putting quasi-translations in footnotes does not make it likely
that readers will easily understand and use his new, idiosyncratic taxonomy. In any event,
just in case, I will provide the translation in text, rather than in footnotes.
42. Verstein discounts the utility of casual tests based on this concept because he assumes that
we would never want to punish people for motives that do not lead to action. Verstein, supra
note 1, at 1129-30. Justice O’Connor articulated a similar idea, noting that we should not
punish people for thought crime, and that Title VII was not a “thought control bill.” Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). As a normative matter, that may be a correct statement. But it is hard to make—much less justify—this
normative conclusion if we do not even consider it. Hence, I will include this causal concept
in my catalog.
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to the causal attribute in question. Because the zone (and Verstein’s label) reﬂects the absence of an attribute (action), we might refer to the causal attribute
as “Action.”43
Second, on Verstein’s basic graph, we can identify a fourth causal attribute
(in addition to necessity, suﬃciency, and action). Consider the entire area of
Verstein’s graph above the B-axis; that is, the area in which there exists some AMotive (A>0). In this zone, the illicit motive (B-Motive) cannot be an exclusive causal force in the decision; another non-proscribed motive (A-Motive)
has exerted at least some quantum of causal force in the decision. As Verstein
notes in his discussion of his “Sole Motive” test, there may be situations where
we might want to let a defendant use the existence of A-Motive (A>0) as a defense to the existence of B-Motive—irrespective of the causal force exerted by
that B-Motive.44

43.

Given that this attribute has not been widely discussed, the nomenclature may be less important than that used for attributes that have been widely discussed.
44. Verstein, supra note 1, at 1139-41. Note that we can identify a converse concept to sole causation. Just as we might ascribe signiﬁcance to the presence of A-Motive (A>0), we might ascribe signiﬁcance to the presence of B-Motive (B>0). This can be understood as a distinction between the vertical axis (where there is no B-Motive) and everything to the right of
that axis (where there is some B-Motive). However, I do not include this in my catalog of
causal concepts because, as a practical matter, the model eﬀectively assumes B>0. Recall that
the legal question that the model seeks to address is whether B-Motive can be considered
causal. It is hard to see how we can discuss whether B-Motive is causal without assuming
that B-Motive exists. Accordingly, I do not include this concept in the catalog.
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As with action, this concept does not have a commonly-used label. The
causal concept here focuses on exclusivity—whether, as between A-Motive and
B-Motive, B-Motive is the exclusive motive for the decision. Hence, I will refer
to this causal concept or attribute as “exclusivity.”45
Finally, when we move beyond the basic graph to the graphs that Verstein
uses to illustrate his two new quantitative causal concepts, we can see that new
terminology is also likely to be required. (By deﬁnition, these quantitative concepts are not susceptible to labeling using qualitative terms.) These graphs
suggest two new causal concepts. The ﬁrst new concept is apparent from his
graph titled “Relative Motives”:46

45.

Some courts and commentators have sometimes referred to a causal test they call a “Sole
Cause” test. See Robert Belton, Causation in Employment Discrimination Law, 34 WAYNE L.
REV. 1235, 1238 (1988) (“Congress and courts have uniformly rejected the ‘sole cause’ test.”);
Verstein, supra note 1, at 1139. As I will discuss below, that test uses the attribute of exclusivity, along with the attribute of action. I prefer the label of exclusivity, as opposed to soleness,
both because the focus of this attribute is on the absence of the other factor (A-Motive), and
because soleness seems awkward as a descriptor for the attribute.
It is tempting to resist the notion of exclusive, or sole, causation, since it is hard to image a person who is ever animated by only one, single-minded motivation. See Dare v. WalMart Stores, 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991 (D. Minn. 2003) (“In practice, few employment decisions are made solely on basis of one rationale to the exclusion of all others.”)110 CONG.
REC. 13,837 (1964) (statement of Sen. Case) (“If anyone ever had an action that was motivated by a single cause, he is a diﬀerent kind of animal from any I know of.”). However, this
concern misapprehends the model. B-Motive is not a sole cause in the sense of excluding all
other causal inﬂuences. Rather, it is a sole cause in the sense that the other potentially relevant (and potentially exculpatory) cause—A-Motive—is not present.
46. Verstein supra note 1, at 1132 ﬁg.4.
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FIGURE 8
VERSTEIN’S RELATIVE MOTIVES GRAPH

Here, we see the idea that we might require B-Motive to exert more causal force
than A-Motive. Verstein uses the label “B-Predomination” to describe this concept. However, since the model is inherently focused on B-Motive, we can
simply refer to this concept as “Predomination.”
The second new quantitative concept is apparent from Verstein’s graph entitled “Tiny Motives.”47

47.

Id. at 1133 ﬁg.5.
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FIGURE 9
VERSTEIN’S TINY MOTIVES GRAPH

In this graph, we can see the distinction between “big” and “little” causes. More
speciﬁcally, Verstein posits a dichotomy between causes that may carry insuﬃcient weight to be considered material. He refers to those causes as “tiny.” But
the causal concept is really about whether a cause can be considered non-tiny
(B>q). So a better way to describe this concept is the one that Verstein uses later in his piece: “Material.”48
D. Putting It All Together
The prior Sections identiﬁed what appears to be the universe of six potentially relevant causal concepts, or building blocks. Where possible, I have labeled these concepts using traditional, widely used labels. We can list that universe of causal concepts—and describe them—as follows:
48.

900

Id. at 1152.
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Necessity (A<1 and A+B>=1)
•
Suﬃciency (B>=1)
•
Predominance (B>A)
•
Materiality (B>q, where q is the point of non-tininess)
•
Exclusivity (A=0)
•
Action (A+B>=1)
Now, for any area on Verstein’s graph, we can indicate whether the B-Motive
possesses that particular causal attribute—or any combination of causal attributes that might be required by a particular test.
To illustrate, I will use Verstein’s Complete Map, which designates regions
using numeric labels49:
•

FIGURE 10
THE COMPLETE MAP OF POTENTIAL CAUSAL CONCEPTS

49.

Id. at 1166 ﬁg.16.
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We can then evaluate that graph against the universe of causal attributes as follows:
FIGURE 11
THE KEY TO CAUSAL CONCEPTS

Zone

B-Motive Present and . . .
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Suﬀ.
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Material
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X

X
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X
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X
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X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Below IV
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This, I would submit, is our Rosetta Stone. It combines Verstein’s Map
with a Key to explain the entire universe of potential causal concepts.50 The
Map and Key clearly deﬁne each of those concepts. And the Key attaches a universally applicable (and what I hope is a universally, or at least widely acceptable) label to each concept.51
When presented with a causal phenomenon in the world (or, at least in the
hypothetical world with only two motives), we should be able to locate it on
the Complete Map, and then use the Key to determine the causal attributes of
that phenomenon. Conversely, when presented with a description of a causal
50.

At least, this appears to be the entire universe of potential causal concepts. It is quite possible that future authors will identify others. Hopefully, Verstein’s Map and my Key will aid in
any such search and analysis.
51. As noted above, where possible, I used labels that have been widely used, which should advance the goals of universal applicability and wide acceptability. Where there were no widely
used labels, I attempted to ﬁnd labels that captured the essence of the concept in question,
which I hope furthers these goals.
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test in the law, we should be able to interrogate which of the six causal attributes the test seems to require. Then, based on the constellation of causal attributes required, we can depict the test on the graph—such that we can determine
whether an observed fact pattern satisﬁes the test.
For example, suppose that we conclude that, upon ﬁnding the existence of
B-Motive (B>0), a particular law requires only Action (A+B>=1); it does not
require any of the other ﬁve causal attributes. We could present that test on a
graph as follows:
FIGURE 12
THE “MOTIVATING FACTOR” TEST

This graph is similar to the graph that Verstein presents to depict his “Any Motive” test.52 As Verstein notes, the graph is likely the best understanding of the

52.

Id. at 1142 ﬁg.9. As noted above, the label “Any Motive” is inapt. Recall that, in this model,
the focus is on B-Motive. The question is whether there is any B-Motive present (B>0). So
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“Motivating Factor” test used in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (at least with the
slight modiﬁcation to exclude the A-axis, since there must be at least some BMotive).53
Or suppose that, upon ﬁnding the existence of B-Motive (B>0), the law
requires both (1) an Action (A+B>=1), and (2) Necessity (A<1). We could present that test graphically as follows:
FIGURE 13
THE NECESSITY (OR “BUT FOR”) TEST

This is the “but for” test, which Verstein depicts and which he notes is used in
numerous areas of the law.54

we do not care whether there is “Any Motive.” Rather, we care whether there is “Any BMotive.”
53. Id. 1152.
54. Id. at 1137-39.
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Conversely, we can use the Map and Key to deconstruct graphically-deﬁned
tests into their component causal attributes. For example, consider the Primary
Motive test posited by Verstein55:
FIGURE 14
THE “PRIMARY MOTIVE” TEST

This test appears to require (1) Predominance (B>A), and (2) Action
(A+B>=1).
Or consider the Sole Motive test posited by Verstein56:

55.
56.

Id. at 1135 ﬁg.6.
Id. at 1140 ﬁg.8.
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FIGURE 15
THE “SOLE MOTIVE” TEST

This test appears to require (1) Exclusivity (A=0), and (2) Action (A+B>=1).57
***
My point here is not to decode the various tests that Verstein has identiﬁed,
though it is certainly possible to do that using the Map and Key. Rather, it is to
illustrate that, using the Map and Key, we can (1) identify the universe of potentially applicable causal attributes, (2) clearly deﬁne each of those attributes
and their relationship to one another, and (3) attach a universally applicable
(and hopefully universally acceptable) label to each causal attribute. This, in
turn, should allow us to describe precisely any causal test that is based upon
57.
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A variation on this “Sole Motive” test might be a “Sole Material Motive” test. That is, a law
might not require that A=0, but only that A is tiny (A<q, where q is the point of nontininess).
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those attributes—which should include all possible causal tests. In other words,
with the additions proposed here, I believe that Verstein has found the Rosetta
Stone.
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